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Abstract
The universality of critical phenomena is best explained by ap-
peal to the Renormalisation Group (RG). Batterman and Morrison,
among others, have claimed that this explanation is irreducible. I ar-
gue that the RG account is reducible, but that the higher-level expla-
nation ought not to be eliminated. I demonstrate that the key assump-
tion on which the explanation relies – the scale invariance of critical
systems – can be explained in lower-level terms; however, we should
not replace the RG explanation with a bottom-up account, rather we
should acknowledge that the explanation appeals to dependencies
which may be traced down to lower levels.
1 Introduction
While universality is best explained with reference to the Renormalisation
Group (RG), that explanation is nonetheless reducible. The argument in de-
fence of this claim is of philosophical interest for two reasons: first, the RG
explanation of universality has been touted by Batterman (2000, 2017) and
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Morrison (2012, 2014) as a significant impediment to reduction. Second,
universality is a paradigm instance of multiple realisability (MR) in the
philosophy of physics; as such it is regarded as irreducible by those who
accept the multiple realisability argument against reduction. My account
charts a middle course: I deny claims that RG explanations are irreducible,
and I deny that universality is best explained from the bottom up.
The view of reduction advocated here is non-eliminativist; the best ex-
planations are often higher-level explanations: such explanations are more
parsimonious, more robust, and have broader applicability than lower-
level explanations. In general, such higher-level explanations ought not
to be replaced by lower-level explanations, rather the parts of theories on
which such explanations rely may be understood in lower-level terms; re-
ducible explanations satisfy the following two conditions: (a) each higher-
level explanatory dependency is explained by or derived from a lower-level
dependency, and (b) the abstractions involved in constructing the higher-
level explanations are justified from the bottom up.1
In §2 I outline the RG explanation of universality. Although my reduc-
tive claims may generalise, I focus exclusively on the field-theoretic ap-
proach to the RG.2 I claim that this explanation follows a general formula
for explaining multiply realised phenomena. §3 considers the arguments
of Batterman and Morrison, and analyses their force against any putative
reduction.
In §4 I note that the RG explanation is a higher-level explanation. As
it is less contentious that the common features of each universality class
are reducible, I simply assume that that’s the case in this paper. The nub
of the debate rests on the RG: I show that the RG arguments rely on the
assumption of scale invariance and the abstractions engendered by that
assumption. I argue that the applicability of this assumption may be ex-
plained from the bottom up. Thus, I claim, that my reduction satisfies (a)
and (b) above.
1While I expect the claims in this paper to be compatible with many different accounts
of explanation, they are most straightforwardly cashed out on an interventionist approach
– see Woodward (2003).
2See Franklin (2018) and Mainwood (2006) for arguments that only this approach pro-
vides an adequate explanation of universality.
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2 The RG Explanation of Universality
‘Universality’ refers to the phenomenon whereby diverse systems exhibit
similar scaling behaviour on the approach to a continuous phase transition.
Continuous phase transitions occur at the critical temperature, a point be-
yond which systems no longer undergo first-order phase transitions.3 The
approach to this phase transition can be very well described by power laws
of the form ai(t) ∝ tα where t is proportional to the temperature deviation
from the critical temperature and α is the critical exponent – a fixed number
which leads to a characteristic curve on temperature-density plots.4
Different physical systems can be categorised into universality classes:
members of the same class have identical critical behaviour – the same
set of critical exponents {α, β, ...} for several power laws – while their be-
haviour away from the critical point and microscopic organisation may be
radically different. For example, fluids and magnets are in the same univer-
sality class despite otherwise having totally different chemical and physical
properties.
Each physical system which exhibits critical phenomena may be de-
scribed at the critical point by the same mathematical object – the Landau-
Ginzburg-Wilson (LGW) Hamiltonian. That Hamiltonian will include the
features – the symmetry and dimensionality – which sort these systems
into their universality classes. The RG argument demonstrates that the
LGW Hamiltonian applies to a wide range of systems at the critical point
by showing that any additional operators which may be appended to that
Hamiltonian will fall away on approach to criticality, where only the cen-
tral LGW operators will remain. The following steps are essential to the
explanation thus on offer:5
1. Define the effective Hamiltonian for your system of interest:
(i) Specify the order parameter with symmetry and dimensionality.
(ii) Specify the central operators of the LGW Hamiltonian.
3Note that not all continuous phase transitions are associated with first-order phase tran-
sitions in this way.
4E.g. the specific heat (in zero magnetic field) c scales as c ∼ (t−α)/α as t → 0 where
t = T−Tc
Tc
.
5 To see a full account of the physics of universality and details of the RG see Binney et
al. (1992) and Fisher (1998); the philosophical aspects of such an explanation are discussed
in detail in Batterman (2016) and Franklin (2018).
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(iii) Specify operators in addition to the terms in the LGW Hamilto-
nian.
2. Apply the RG transformations to that Hamiltonian.
3. Examine the flow towards fixed points in the critical region and note
that some operators are irrelevant to the critical behaviour.
4. Thus divide the set of operators into subsets: ‘relevant’, ‘irrelevant’
and ‘marginally relevant’.
5. Repeat for other systems of interest.
In order to explain universality we must identify commonalities be-
tween the different systems in the same universality class – 1(i) and 1(ii)
above – and show that such commonalities are sufficient for the common
behaviour – 2-4 above. Although 1(iii) can’t, in general, be done explic-
itly, the explanation only depends on the RG demonstration that all dis-
tinguishing features are irrelevant – it’s not necessary to say exactly which
those distinguishing features are. As discussed below, the infinities which
are central to some of the anti-reductionist arguments feature in steps 3 and
4.
Overall the explanation takes the following form: consider a univer-
sality class composed of four different physical systems A-D. Each of A-D
is described in step 1 by an effective Hamiltonian; effective Hamiltonians
are ascribed to systems on the basis of various theoretical and empirical
data. The RG explanation of universality, by virtue of steps 2-4, tells us that
all the details which distinguish A-D, i.e. their irrelevant operators, are, in
fact, irrelevant to the critical phenomena. Thus we have an explanation for
how otherwise different systems exhibit the same phenomena at the critical
point. This explanation relies, of course, on the RG transformations which
allow for the categorisation of certain operators as irrelevant.
Importantly, this explanation takes the form of a general explanation
of multiply realised phenomena: such phenomena are explained if com-
monalities are identified among the realisers and these are shown to be
sufficient for the multiply realised phenomena to occur. Note that such ex-
planations may be higher level and nothing written so far establishes their
reducibility.
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3 Anti-reductionist Arguments
Batterman (2000, 2017) and Morrison (2012, 2014) offer two arguments in
defence of the view that the explanation just outlined is irreducible. The
more general argument is that universality, qua instance of multiple realis-
ability, is irreducible because multiple realisability requires abstracted ex-
planations of a particular form.
However, one goal of this paper is to demonstrate that just such ab-
stracted explanations may be reducible. Insofar as my reduction of the RG
explanation goes through, we are thus faced with a dilemma: either some
instances of MR are, in principle, reducible, or universality is not a case of
MR. While I would opt for the former horn, nothing in the rest of the paper
hangs on that choice.
The second anti-reductionist argument is much more specific to the case
at hand and involves various demonstrations that the RG explanation re-
quires infinities which are inexplicable from the bottom up. As noted by
Palacios (2017), two different limits are invoked in the case of continuous
phase transitions – the thermodynamic limit and the limit of scale invari-
ance. There is an extensive literature on the thermodynamic limit as it ap-
pears in first order phase transitions; as I see no salient differences between
appeal to this limit in the two contexts, I do not discuss this further here
– see e.g. Butterfield and Bouatta (2012) for a reductionist account of that
limit.6
The second limit is discussed by Butterfield and Bouatta (2012), Callen-
der and Menon (2013), Palacios (2017), and Saatsi and Reutlinger (2018),
among others, and these papers undermine claims that continuous phase
transitions are irreducible. However, they pay insufficient attention to the
specific role played by the RG (and by the limit of scale invariance) in estab-
lishing the irrelevance of certain details, and it is this role which is crucial
to the anti-reductionist arguments.7
For Batterman, the RG is required because it allows us to answer the
following question:
6The reductionist claims made here are conditional on a successful resolution of such
issues.
7For example, Saatsi and Reutlinger (2018, p. 473) do not consider a counterfactual of
the form ‘if a physical system S did not exhibit effective scale invariance at criticality, then
S would not exhibit the critical phenomena of any universality class’ in their list of counter-
factuals which the RG account is supposed to underwrite.
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MR: How can systems that are heterogeneous at some (typ-
ically) micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the
macro-scale? . . .
if one thinks (MR) is a legitimate scientific question, one
needs to consider different explanatory strategies. The renor-
malization group and the theory of homogenization are just
such strategies. They are inherently multi-scale. They are not
bottom-up derivational explanations.
[Batterman (2017, pp. 4, 14-15)]
As further elaborated below, the RG seems to Batterman to preclude
“bottom-up derivational explanation” because it requires the following in-
finitary assumption:
This [fixed point] is a point in the parameter space which,
under τ [the RG transformation], is its own trajectory. That
is, it represents a state of a system which is invariant under
the renormalization group transformation. Of necessity, such
a fixed point has an infinite correlation length and so lies on the
critical surface S∞. The singularity/divergence of the correla-
tion length ξ is necessary.
[Batterman (2011, p. 1045), original emphasis]
I accept that the RG formalism makes use of infinite limits. The salient
question, to borrow Norton’s (2012) distinction, is whether such infinities
are approximations which allow one to use the more tractable infinitary
mathematics to approximate features of the finite systems, or, alternatively,
idealisations which describe a distinct infinite system. Claiming that the in-
finities are idealisations would preclude reduction because the macroscopic
system with infinite properties has features which may not be reductively
explained.
As Batterman demonstrates, the RG argument rests on the assumption
of the infinite correlation length which generates absolute scale invariance.
In §4 I claim that the physical systems under consideration are not abso-
lutely scale invariant: in fact, one may abstract from the details of the un-
derlying system insofar as such systems are effectively scale invariant; thus
the infinitary assumption is best viewed as an approximation.
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While Morrison (2014, p. 1155) likewise focusses on explanations of MR
phenomena, she claims that RG explanations are irreducible for a differ-
ent, but related, reason: the “RG functions not only as a calculational tool
but as the source of physical information as well”. Morrison (2012) makes
a similar argument in relation to symmetry breaking in the physics of su-
perconductors. She argues that, in both cases, top-down constraints play
an essential role in the physical descriptions which thus rules out reduc-
tion. In the present context, Morrison’s views may be understood as taking
the RG invocation of scale symmetry to be a necessary physical assump-
tion which cannot be understood from the bottom up. Below I argue that
the effective scale invariance on which the RG rests is, in fact, reductively
explicable. As such, no top-down organising principles are required and
Morrison’s claims are deflated.
4 Reducing the RG Explanation
Arguments for the reducibility of the explanation of universality have pri-
marily been targeted at Batterman’s claims that infinities are essential to
the models used to describe continuous phase transitions. I do not have
space to consider these arguments in any detail. Suffice it to say that, in my
view, none succeeds in reducing the principal feature of the renormalisa-
tion group – the assumption of scale invariance. Thus I focus on that aspect
of the RG, and claim that it, too, is reducible.
Furthermore, with the notable exception of Saatsi and Reutlinger (2018),
not much attention has been paid to the explanation of universality per se.
This, of course, makes a difference for MR-based objections to reduction,
which raise doubts that a reductionist account could explain why the same
phenomenon is exhibited in multiple different systems.
As far as the physics is currently developed, the RG plays an inelim-
inable role in the explanation of universality: it is the only mathematical
framework available to predict the precise extent of observed universality
of critical phenomena. If its application were truly mysterious, if we had
no idea why it worked, then, infinity or no infinity, this would provide ex-
actly the right kind of failure of explanation on which the anti-reductionist
could hang their arguments.
I argue in the following that the applicability of the RG to systems un-
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dergoing continuous phase transitions is not mysterious. The RG exploits
effective scale invariance to set up equations which tell us how certain
properties vary with respect to the variation of other properties. It is a
piece of mathematics whose applicability is deeply physical – where the
assumptions invoked in applying the RG do not hold, the RG’s predictions
go wrong.
In order fully to reduce the RG explanation, one also must consider the
common features shared by each member of the same universality class,
and argue that these, too, are reducible to aspects of the microphysical de-
scription. Such arguments have been given by the reductionists mentioned
above. The innovation of this paper lies in reducing the RG framework, and
the assumptions on which it relies; thus, given space constraints, I do not
consider the reduction of the symmetry, dimensionality and representation
by common Hamiltonians.
4.1 Reducing the Renormalisation Group
The RG argument rests on the assumption of scale invariance, and this is
crucial to the demonstration that a class of operators are irrelevant at crit-
icality. I claim that we can provide a bottom-up explanation of this scale
invariance and that, as such, the RG arguments provide a mathematical
apparatus for relating scale invariance to the irrelevance of certain details.
One can see, heuristically, how scale invariance relates to universality: if the
system at criticality is effectively scale invariant then many of that systems’
features – those which are scale dependent – will turn out to be irrelevant
at criticality, and all that will remain are those shared features such as the
symmetry and dimensionality.
To argue that the RG explanation is reducible, I first give a more general
characterisation of an RG flow. The calculation of each system’s dynamics
involves integration over a range of scales and energies. The highest en-
ergy (smallest scale) cutoff (denoted Λ) corresponds to the impossibility of
fluctuations on a scale smaller than the distance between the particles in
the physical system. The RG transformation involves decreasing the cutoff
thereby increasing the minimum scale of fluctuations considered. Iterating
this transformation generates a flow through parameter space designed to
maintain the Hamiltonian form and qualitative properties of the system in
question.
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The RG transformation R transforms a set of (coupling) parameters
{K} to another set {K ′} such thatR{K} = {K ′}. {K∗} is the set of param-
eters which corresponds to a fixed point, defined such thatR{K∗} = {K∗}.
This fixed point corresponds to the critical point defined physically. At the
fixed point, the RG transformation (which changes the scale of fluctuations)
makes no difference. Thus the fixed point encodes the property of scale in-
variance.
Given the Hamiltonian of one of our models, one can define an RG
transformation which generates a flow that allows one to: (i) classify certain
of the coupling parameters of the system in question as (ir)relevant to its
behaviour near the fixed point, (ii) extract the critical exponents from the
scaling behaviour near the fixed point.
The RG may be understood as a mathematical framework for explor-
ing how certain properties vary with changing energy, length-scale, or, by
proxy, temperature, on approach to the scale invariant critical point. Philo-
sophical discussions of the RG are occasionally prone to mysterianism, but
the RG should be considered to be no different from, for example, the cal-
culus. As Wilson (1975, p. 674) notes: “the renormalization group . . . is the
tool that one uses to study the statistical continuum limit [the point of scale
invariance] in the same way that the derivative is the basic procedure for
studying the ordinary continuum limit”.
The Hamiltonian which represents the system at the critical point, from
which the critical exponents are extracted, is scale invariant at the fixed
point – all the scale dependent contributions have gone to zero. Such Hamil-
tonians are known as ‘renormalisable’. As such, the explanation provided
below for the effective scale invariance of physical systems at criticality
underlies the fact that such systems are well-described by renormalisable
Hamiltonians at fixed points.
My argument has two steps: I demonstrate that scale invariance is im-
plicit in the power law behaviour which is intrinsic to universality; then I
provide a bottom-up explanation of the effective scale invariance for liquid-
gas systems, a story somewhat motivated by the observation of critical
opalescence. Thus, I show how scale invariance features in the mathemat-
ics – the Hamiltonian’s renormalisability and the power laws, and how it
features in the observed physics – the critical opalescence is a direct conse-
quence of the bottom-up story.
The universality of critical phenomena lies in the sharing of power laws,
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and hence critical exponents, between members of the same universality
class. In what sense are such power laws scale-free? As Binney et al. (1992,
p. 20) explain, a phenomenon obeying a power law is independent of scale
because one could multiply its characteristic scale length by some factor
and the ratio of values will remain constant. For example, consider the
power law f1 = (r/r0)η, and its measurement in the range (0.5r0, 2r0). The
ratio of largest to smallest value will be identical for measurements centred
on r0, 10r0, 100r0 – it will always be 4|η|, thus one may superimpose all the
power laws by a simple change of scale. By contrast, for f2 = exp(r/r0) the
ratio of values will change on scale changes.
Such systems are therefore described as scale-free; the RG is used to pre-
dict that at the point of scale invariance the heterogeneous features will be
irrelevant. So, in order to work out when this framework is applicable, and
why it works, we ought to look at each individual system, (for our pur-
poses let’s reserve inquiry to liquid-gas and ferromagnetic-paramagnetic
systems) and identify the underlying processes which lead to effective scale
invariance at the critical point. The following two caveats apply to this pro-
posal for reduction:
First, it might be objected that universality may only be explained if
the same processes are identified across all the systems exhibiting the uni-
versal behaviour; if that were so, the strategy employed here would be
inadequate. However, universality may be explained by demonstrating
that two conditions are fulfilled: that all the systems share common fea-
tures, and that their heterogeneous details are irrelevant. While it’s essen-
tial that the common features are shared by all the systems, the mechanism
by which the heterogeneities are irrelevant may differ, so long as all the
heterogeneities in fact end up as irrelevant.
Second, although the power laws and renormalisable Hamiltonians at
the fixed point are absolutely scale invariant, the physical systems will, at
best, be effectively scale invariant – that is, scale invariant within a certain
range of length-scales. That should be acceptable because we know that
scale invariance is never exactly true of a system: any real system will be
finite and thus violate the assumption at some scale. Moreover, this will
not generate empirical problems because the power laws are observed for
systems approaching criticality – they are predictions about T → Tc, not
T = Tc. Thus one should only assume that critical exponents asymptoti-
cally approach those predicted at the fixed point. While infinite assump-
tions are required in order to impose the full scale invariance for RG analy-
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sis, I claim that we can explain effective scale invariance for finite systems,
and that absolute scale invariance is an approximation invoked to make the
mathematics tractable.
Scale invariance, as it manifests in systems at criticality, is known as
‘self-similarity’: as scales change the system resembles itself. How do we
account for such self-similarity? The critical point, at which a continuous
phase transition occurs, corresponds (for liquid-gas systems) to the highest
temperature and pressure at which liquid and gas phases can be distin-
guished.
As is well known, there is a plateau in pressure-volume diagrams, which
corresponds to the latent heat (or enthalpy) of vapourisation. This, roughly,
is the extra energy needed to break the intermolecular bonds which distin-
guish liquids from gases and vapours. At the critical point this plateau,
and the latent heat of vapourisation vanishes. Now it’s difficult precisely
to work out the binding energies of the intermolecular bonds. The values
for this will be material dependent, and surface tension dependent, and
will change at different pressures. But the heuristic argument tells us that
the reason the plateau vanishes is because the system has enough temper-
ature, and thus the molecules have sufficient energy to equal the binding
energy. The point at which binding energy is exactly matched by kinetic
energy will be the critical point.
The isothermal compressibility (κ) is defined as κT = −1V
(
∂V
∂p
)
T
. This
corresponds to how much the volume will change (∂V ) with a given pres-
sure change (∂p) at fixed temperature (T ). As supercritical fluids have
far higher compressibility than liquids, and both are present at the criti-
cal point, the compressibility diverges. Given, in addition, that the latent
heat is zero at criticality, there’s nothing to prevent a given bubble expand-
ing arbitrarily. Thus we ought to expect the system to have bubbles of all
sizes: this is what is meant by the claim that the system is dominated by
fluctuations and has no characteristic scale.8
Negligible energy cost for transitions and infinite compressibility leads
to self-similarity, and, in certain fluids, the bubbles at all scales lead to a
high refraction of visible light. Thus otherwise transparent fluid may be-
come opaque and milky-white. This is known as ‘critical opalescence’ – see
figure 1(a) – and is a visible correlate of a system at criticality.
8Note that, for first order phase transitions, the compressibility also diverges; this
doesn’t lead to scale invariance because latent heat is finite.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: From Binney et al. (1992, pp. 10,19). (a) Critical opalescence is visible when arbi-
trarily large bubbles form in liquid at criticality. (b) Increasing loss of characteristic scale as
T → Tc in simulations of the Ising model.
Such self-similarity is conceptually crucial to the applicability of the
renormalisation group: in order to extract critical exponents from RG equa-
tions one identifies a renormalisable Hamiltonian which is scale invariant
at the fixed point. Without fluctuations across all scales, systems would fail
to be well modelled by such Hamiltonians. The physical argument for di-
verging fluctuation size justifies the use of a scale invariant mathematical
model to represent such systems. Thus, for critical phenomena, the appli-
cability of the RG depends on scale invariance, where this assumption is
explicable from the bottom up.
Demonstrating these claims quantitatively is difficult, but the heuristic
argument is convincing. Kathmann (2006) reviews theories of the nucle-
ation of gas bubbles in water which generate accurate predictions concern-
ing the rate of bubble growth and the threshold for stability over a range
of temperatures; although these models do not reach the critical point,
progress is being made.9
9Constructing exact models is especially difficult because of the fluctuations at a wide
range of length scales – precisely the reason that the RG is employed.
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Of course, further work could be done to develop these arguments and
make them more precise. But there seems to be, in the above, a sound
qualitative argument and no in-principle barriers to full derivation. This
‘in-principle’ ought not to be problematic: we know the relevant physical
principles, even if quantitative models are still unavailable.
Moreover, as discussed below, and depicted in figure 1(b), the Ising
model allows us quantitatively to predict analogues of the results for liquid-
gas systems. While well short of a full explanation, the following discus-
sion illustrates how self-similarity may be reduced for magnetic systems.
By treating the Ising model as a stand-in for such systems, a similar kind of
reasoning to that given above will go through.
Below the critical point, energy fluctuations will lead to random iso-
lated spin flips. Such flips will be energetically costly and tend to be re-
versed. The higher the energy, the more likely these are to occur, and if suf-
ficiently many occur then a patch will form, and other spins will have some
tendency to align themselves with this patch. However, below the critical
point, such patches beyond a certain size will be too costly and spins will
overall remain aligned (there is some small probability of net magnetisation
flipping, but this is increasingly unlikely further below the critical point).
At the critical point, the energy of the atoms in the lattice is greater than
the energetic cost of violating spin alignment, and patches can become ar-
bitrarily large. This results from the latent heat’s vanishing and the diver-
gence of the magnetic susceptibility (χ) on approach to the critical point.
χT =
(
∂m
∂B
)
T
where m is the magnetisation and B represents an external
magnetic field. Universality is manifested by the fact that the susceptibil-
ity and the compressibility both diverge according to identical power laws
with the same critical exponent γ: χT , κT ∼ (T −Tc)−γ . Thus, we have self-
similarity and effective scale invariance with bubbles or patches arbitrarily
large up to the size of the system.
My aim is to establish the reducibility of the RG relevance and irrele-
vance arguments. I have demonstrated that the RG is a mathematical pro-
cedure that extracts information based on the empirically and theoretically
justified assumption of effective scale invariance; this has been shown to
be a property shared by different systems at criticality. The key ingredients
for effective scale invariance are features of the interactions of neighbouring
sub-systems, and the particulate constitution of the materials. While that
suggests that these materials are not so different after all, it’s worth empha-
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sising that the systems which exhibit universal behaviour are nonetheless
dissimilar away from the critical point – it’s clear that magnets and liquids
have many distinct chemical and physical properties.
The assumption of scale invariance plays a crucial role for the RG – it
licences the discarding of scale dependent details; it is precisely this dis-
carding of details which ensures that all systems are commonly described
at the critical point. Moreover, discarding such details is what gives the
higher-level explanation its stability and parsimony. It is thus incumbent
on the reductionist to explain how the higher-level RG account is success-
ful despite its leaving out such details. So, the reductionist should identify
physical processes at the lower level which ensure the irrelevance of the
discarded details.
As argued above, the physical processes in question are exactly those
which lead to effective scale invariance. The fluctuations at all scales make
it such that the scale-dependent properties which distinguish systems away
from criticality are irrelevant at criticality, when the system is effectively
scale invariant. We have identified, at the molecular level, the physical
mechanisms which prevent variations in the discarded details from lead-
ing to changes in the higher-level description of the system. As such, we
are assured that the explanatory value of the higher-level explanation is a
consequence of features of the lower-level system.
One upshot of this reductionist account is that we may specify the con-
ditions under which the higher-level description remains a good one. The
discarded details are irrelevant while the large scale fluctuations – the bub-
bles or patches – dominate the physics. As we move to systems which are
less scale invariant, as the bubbles die down, the critical point becomes
a less accurate description and each system in the class will start to ex-
hibit distinct behaviour. This is reflected in the fact that the macroscale RG
description only derives the shared behaviour at the fixed point of scale
invariance and predicts distinct behaviour away from the fixed point.
I end this section with the following intuitive physical gloss on the RG
explanation: “[b]ecause the fluctuations extend over regions containing
very many particles, the details of the particle interactions are irrelevant,
and a great deal of similarity is found in the critical behavior of diverse
systems” (A. L. Sengers, Hocken, and J. V. Sengers (1977, p.42)). Since we
can explain the wide-ranging fluctuations from the bottom-up, the RG ex-
planation of universality is reducible.
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5 Conclusion
The field-theoretic RG framework, together with the common features of
physical systems in the same universality class, explains how those sys-
tems all display the same critical phenomena when undergoing continuous
phase transitions. That explanation is a higher-level explanation.
That higher-level RG explanation is nonetheless reducible. That is, we
may explain in terms of the microstructure of each system how it is that
each aspect of the higher-level explanation is explanatory. We may, in par-
ticular, show why the RG categorisation of operators as relevant and irrel-
evant works. That division depends on the assumption of scale invariance,
and the assumption of scale invariance is justifiable when systems are ef-
fectively scale invariant at criticality.
The anti-reductionist claim that universality is MR, and MR is essen-
tially irreducible has been undermined by demonstrating that we may ar-
rive at a bottom-up understanding of the common features and of what
makes such features sufficient for the common behaviour.
The further argument that the use of the infinite limit imposes an irre-
ducible divide between the higher-level and lower-level models has simi-
larly been countered: while we move to the infinite limit in order to make
the mathematics simpler, the effective scale invariance can be shown to fol-
low from details of the particle interactions at criticality – that’s what identi-
fies the critical point and allows us to make the corresponding abstractions
from scale dependent details. Provided with this bottom-up explanation,
there is no further reason to claim that the infinite limit is an idealisation
rather than an approximation: for we have explained from the bottom up
how the system is approximately self-similar.
One upshot of this discussion is that the RG is not to be regarded as
mysterious, or, somehow, as the source of physical information. It is appli-
cable only insofar as the systems to which it is applied have the relevant
properties, and their having such properties may be reductively explained.
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